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ABSTRACT The
sobjectlve of this study is to analyze the effect of
a comprehensive performance measurement system
20n managerial performance mediated by distributive justice and
interactional justice. The study population is the managers of manufacturing companies in Jakarta using
respondents of 84 managers of the company. The research data are the primary data obtained by sending
questionnaires to the respondents, The data were analyzed using regression analysis and using warp-PLS
application, The results showed that the system of performance measurement comprehensively affects the
managerial performance,
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10distributive justice and interactional justice. Distributive justice and
interactional justice
influence and can improve managerial performance because they are can eliminate subordinate mistrust to
superiors and among subordinates. Key words: comprehensive performance measurement system,
distributive justice, interactional justice, managerial performance. Cite this Article: Susiana Susiana, Imam
Ghozali, Fuad Fuad and Zulaikha Zulaikha, The Effect of the Comprehensive Performance Measurement
System of Managerial Performance: Distributive and Interactional Justice as the Mediators. International
Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology, 8(8), 2017, pp. 334-342.
http://www.iaeme.comIlJCIEET/issues.asp?JType=IJCIET&VType=8&ITyype=8 1. INTRODUCTION
Performance measurement is very important because it relates to performance appraisals associated with
acceptance to be received by individuals (1).The company implemented a system used to measure the level
of achievement of performance practice as previously http://www.iaeme.comIlJCIET/index.asp 334 planned
and useful for the development of managerial compensation and organizational goals (2). The performance
measurement is useful for managers as motivation to mobilize efforts to achieve organizational goals.
Performance measurement in management accounting is a very important area for a company's survival (3).
Research on performance measurement system (PMS) has not been widely discussed in accounting
management studies (4).Some of the previous researchers examined the PMS and the managerial
performance (MP), among others: (5);(6);(7);(2). Among these studies, inconsistent results are still found.
This is due to the indirect relationship of CPM and MP that must use variables mediating(5). Some of the
variables used as mediators include: clarity of roles and psychological empowerment (5), procedural justice
and organizational commitment (8), motivation (9);mental capital and mental development (10). This study
examines how the influence of comprehensive performance measurement system (CPMS) on managerial
performance (MP) is viewed from the perspective of application and perception of fairness in the context of
management accounting. This research uses the variable of distributive justice (DJ) and interactional justice
(IJ) as a mediation that can bridge the CPMS and PM. The main reason why it is necessary to consider the
consequences of DJ and IJ in CPMS implementation is that the CPMS is one of the control tools of a
management control system that aims to align management behavior to the achievement of corporate
objectives (11).Performance measurement can lead to both positive and negative reactions (12),can
influence attitudes and behavior (Lau and Moser, 2008).The consequences of applying organizational justice
lead to values agreed upon by individuals within the company(1). To answer the problem of the research, the
authors conducted a survey on companies, especially manufacturing companies located in Jakarta. The
reason for choosing manufacturing companies in Jakarta is because most or more than 80% of Indonesian
manufacturing companies are located in Jakarta and they have implemented CPMS (4).Meanwhile, the
respondents of this study is the middle and functional managers of the company namely: marketing
manager, financial and accounting manager, human resources manager, and operational manager. The
reason of using the managers is that the managers are fully responsible for their function and authority. This
research can provide benefits and contributions to: first, accounting science, especially management
accounting. CPMS application of justice to managerial performance is still not widely discussed in
management accounting (13);(14); (7).Previous research focused on accounting-based performance
measurement(15); (3);(16).Second, the research model examines CPMS, distributive justice and
interactional justice on managerial performance. Previous studies have not yet applied distributive and
interactional justice to managerial performance. 2. LITERATURE REVIEW In general, researchers assume
that CPMS can improve
4distributive justice and interactional justice and will be able to
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improve managerial performance Thus, it is expected that there will be transparency in the implementation
of performance measurement so as to avoid misunderstanding of the assessment. If justice has been
implemented, it will be able to improve managerial performance. 2.1. The Influence of CPMS with MP CPMS
provide information relevant to decision making. Relevant information is obtained from performance
measurement tools covering both financial and non-financial aspects (7).CPMS is used to measure long-
term performance (8), the measurement of the various value chains within the firm (17)comprises multiple
measurement sequences that maintain key or key performance areas of a business unit (5), andis a system
for building mental and mental capital managers (10). The use of CPMS is very important because the
information obtained is useful for managers and can improve managerial performance. Performance
measurement system by a company will motivate managers so that managers can work better (9).lf the
CPMS are well executed, the information will be obtained quickly and can improve managerial performance
2.2. The Effect of CPMS on DJ CPMS is a performance measurement system that is very important because
it involves earned income such as, reward, remuneration and promotion possision for managers, can be
categorized with the promotion that will be obtained. If the performance evaluation process is perceived to
be unfair, they tend to be unfavorable to their superiors, it may lead to a disquieting attitude towards the
boss because superiors are viewed in unjust procedural use (8). The concept of distributive justice is
2based on the principle of justice. The allocation of benefits and costs in the
group should be proportional to the contribution of group members
(18).Characteristics of performance measurement can affect the scope workload and authority as a
manager. Performance measurement can provide more accurate datalinformation (8), with the data can be
determined the amount of compensation to be received. This makes it possible to determine the size of the
manager's efforts accurately. Performance measurement system is used by managers to make decisions
about determining the amount of incentives to be paid to employees(1). Organizational justice theory (19)
explains that subjective norms are formed from normative beliefs that consist of two main aspects: belief and
hope.This belief refers to how much individual expectations are perceived by the individual in relation to the
fair procedure of the management of the company, and is thought to influence the individual to produce high
performance.This is in line with goal setting theory that states that a performance measurement system
associated with cognition and eventually lead to feedback and hope (expectancy/self- efficacy)(20). 2.3. The
Effect of DJ on PM The results received will be fair if they are based on the business
estimator. Measurement of performance based on the effort made in accordance with the results obtained
will be able to improve performance because the individual felt noticed by the company (21); (3).This allows
individuals to understand how their relationship with the company in the long run.The action presents an
accurate and objective picture of the subordinate performance level (3). The goal is to be achieved when
employees
5feel that they are accepted and valued by the
company.Performance measurement system and fairness towards employees' working result is something
that has been conducted in accordance with a fair procedure,
5regardless of whether the decision made favorable or unfavorable for them
(18).Employees will accept company policies if the company provides an explanation of the workload and
the magnitude of the results to be obtained by the company's employees (1). 2.4. The Effect of CPMSon IJ
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Performance measurement systems can help managers to interact with company members. Managers can
interpret the performance measurement system comprehensively to help businesses to integrate the various
business units implemented and will affect the interaction of members of the company (22).(23)identified
company goals in a broad perspective that illustrates not only financial or financial-oriented
aspects. Subordinates assume that the company's performance measurement system is in compliance with
the policies set by the company. If the company has a fair policy execution,therewill be an interaction among
subordinates.This is because the system that regulates the performance measurement involves members of
the company, so it results tointeraction between the boss and subordinates. Interactional justice emerged
from the leadership of the company membersin a faircorporate policy (24).Because managers are required
to be able to treat employees fairly, if justice is done, it will create a harmonious interaction that can make
the motivation for members of the company in improving theirperformance. 2.5. The Influence of IJ on PM
41nteractional justice focuses on individual perceptions of the treatment
received from superiors over policy enforcement. Usually the treatment received isin the form of treatment to
show social sensitivity, such as politeness conducted by the justice initiator against the receiver of fairness,
respect, honesty, dignity (25).(26) found that interactional justice has treatment that reflects how far people
4are treated with courtesy, dignity and respect by the
, .
employer or supervisor in carrying out the determination of the results. Interactional justice focuses on the
explanation given by the employer to any person to convey information on the procedure used and the
results will be shared (25). The relationship between decision maker and receiver, may establish
interpersonal criteria.ln the context of justice, common belief is seen from the model of procedural and
interactional justice. However, there are differences in both models. The context of procedural justice believes
in the organization while confidence interactional justice addresses to the boss or leader(25).Performance
measurement companies should be able to pay attention to interactional justice because it will affect the
trust by members of the company.(2) stated that one of the causes of hatred attitude caused negative
attitude toward the decision makers who can be identified with a poor outcome and the procedure unfair. 3.
RESEARCH METHODS 3.1. Data Acquisition Techniques This research is a survey research. The data
used are primary data. The population in this study is the managers of a manufacturing company in
Indonesia.(6) which states that
8companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange
tend to use comprehensive performance measurement system and can
8provide a fairly clear picture of the implementation of the system. Research
subjects are middle and functional managers with the reason: they understand more about the duties and
functions as managers who carry out the responsibilities given to them. 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
There were 400 copies of questionnaires sent to 100 companies.The questionnaires returnedwere84 copies
or 21%.The data received were processed by using Partial Least Square (PLS).ln table 1 shows that the
value of loading factor and convergen validity is above 0.6 which means beingfulfilled because it is above
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport_printview .asp ?eq=O&eb= 1&esm=0&oid=946627368&sid=O&n=O&m=O&svr=326&r=O.1 0994976931342215&lang=en _us
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the required.Thus it can be concluded that the overall construct has a good relationship and can be
analyzed further.
1Table 1 Combined Loadings and Cross-Loadings
Results CPMS OJ IJ MP
1Type (a SE P value C1 0.785 -0. 055 -0. 230 0.077 Reflect 0.086 <0.001 C2 O.
792 -0. 306 O. 024 -0.041 Reflect O. 086 <0.001 C3 O. 816 O. 224 -0. 071 -0.231
Reflect 0.086 <0.001 C4 0.775 O. 018 O. 0830.049 Reflect 0.087 <0.001 C6 O. 672
-0.201 0.2520.195 Reflect O. 089 <0.001 C7 O. 681 0.351 -0.129 -0.106 Reflect O.
089 <0.001 C9 O. 752 -0. 020 O. 098 0.084 Reflect 0.087 <0.001 01 0.114 O. 882 O.
047 -0.192 Reflect 0.084 <0.001 02 -0. 098 O. 886 -0. 091 0.196 Reflect 0.084
<0.001 03 O. 089 O. 946 -0. 082 -0.198 Reflect O. 082 <0.001 04 -0. 027 O. 901 O.
097 -0.101 Reflect O. 084 <0.001 05 -0. 086 O. 866 O. 034 0.317 Reflect 0.084
<0.001 11-0.058 -0. 120 O. 8460.083 Reflect 0.085 <0.001 12-0.
070 -0.280 0.798 0.000 Reflect 0.086 <0.001 130.1140.0930.8030.022 Reflect 0.086 <0.001 140.015
0.2880.866 -0.102 Reflect 0.084 <0.001 P1 0.182 -0.112 0.048 0.803 Reflect 0.086 <0.001 P2 -0.111 -0.135
-0.1240.749 Reflect 0.087 <0.001 P3 0.014 0.232 -0.495 0.642 Reflect 0.090 <0.001 P4 0.035 -0.001 0.056
0.726 Reflect 0.088 <0.001 P5 0.275 0.287 0.138 0.727 Reflect 0.088 <0.001 P8 -0.454 -0.033 -0.071 0.644
Reflect 0.090 <0.001 P9 -0.007 -0.193 0.372 0.746 Reflect 0.087 <0.001 Source: Result of if WarpPLS data
(2016) 4.1. Determining the
3Measurement Model or Outer Model To determine the
................................................. ,
model, the calculation used is discriminant validity, covergent validity and reliability. This is intended
3to determine the validity and reliability of the indicators used in the
study.Measurementisconducted to measure the validity of the latent variables.The following describes the
results of validity test using Warp-PLS. Table 2 Validity Test Results Testing Parameter Value Rule of Thumb
Conclusion Validity CPMS OJ IJ MP 0.570 >0.50 0.804 >0.50 0.687 >0.50 0.521 >0.50 Valid Valid Valid Valid
Source: Result of if WarpPLS data (2016) The test validity of a construct can be known from the value of
AVE; if the value of AVE> 0.5, the model has good convergence validity.The results of data processingabove
shows the value of AVE is above 0.5 which means that the data used has already hadgood convergence
validity. The reliability test isused to measure whether the instrument is an indicator variables or constructs.
The following illustrates the reliability test results using Warp-PLS. The results of data processing above
showthat Cronbach's alpha and Composite realiability valuesareabove 0.70.ltcan be concluded that the
construct has a high reliability or reliable. Table 2 Reliability Test Results Testing Parameter Crombach's
Composite reliability Rule of Reliability alpha coefficients Thumb CPMS 0.873 0.937 >0.70 OJ 0.9370.953
>0.70 IJ 0.848 0.89 8 >0.70 MP 0.845 0.883 >0.70 Source: Result of if WarpPLS data (2016) Conclusion
Reliable Reliable Reliable Reliable 4.2. Testing
https://www.turnitin.com/newreport _printview .asp?eq =O&eb= 1&esm=0&oid=946627368&sid=0&n=0&m =0&svr=326&r=0.1 0994 976931342215&lang=en _us
4/16/2018 Turnitin Originality Report
3Structural Model or Inner Model Inner model testing was done to see the
relationship between latent variables. Structural models were evaluated using the R-square for dependent
constructs.The higher the R square value the betterit isin predicting the outcome model. The data
processing obtained OJ R- square = 0.146,0.180 and IJ = MP = 0.633. From these results, it can be
concluded that the model is good. Hypothesis testing results can be seen from the results of Path Coefficient
as illustrated in table 3. Table 3 Path Coefficient Results CPMS OJ IJ MP OJ 0.382 IJ 0.425 MP 0.363 0.346
0.245 The results of data processing above can be entered into a research model that can be seen in Figure
1 below: Figure 1 Research Framework 5. HYPOTHESIS DISCUSSION Hypothesis 1: CPMS has positive
influenceonMP Test results show that CPMS has an effect of 0.363 at p <0.001.The results of these tests
produced a positive and significant value, which means that hypothesis 1 is accepted and supported. The
findings of this study are consistent with the findings of a study conducted by (5) and (1) stating that CPMS
information can have a positive effect on improving managerial performance. This finding is expected to
provide empirical evidence of the importance of CPMS information to improve managerial performance as it
will affect policy in decision making. This result is not in line with research conducted by (14) which states
that CPM is not related to the MP. Hypothesis 2: CPMS has a positive effect on OJ The result shows the
influence of CPMS on OJ is 0,382 P <0.001 which means thatCPMS has positive effect on OJ showing that
hypothesis 2 is accepted. This hypothesis is in line with (1) study which states that the information obtained
from CMPS will affect OJ, because it is associated with the determination of the amount of acceptance to be
received by subordinates. Hypothesis 3: OJ has positive effect onMP The result shows the influence of OJ
onMP is 0,346 p <0.001 which means that OJ hasinfluence onMP equal to 35%.The results of these tests
produced a positive and significant value, which means that hypothesis 1 is accepted and supported. The
results of this study are in line with research conducted by (1) which states that distributed justice can be
perceived and will improve individual performance. This finding also supports the results of (27) study which
states that distributive justice will improve managerial performance. Hypothesis 4: CPMS positively affects IJ
The result shows the influence of CPMS on IJ is equal to 0,425 p <0.001 which means to have positive and
Significant influence equal to 43%, so hypothesis 4 can be accepted. This finding is in line with research
findings(25)which states that CPMS will affect the interaction relationship between subordinates and
superiors and vice versa. The results of this empirical evidence can provide information and feedback
needed by managers. Hypothesis 5: IJ has a positive effect on PM The result of data processing shows
influence of IJ with PM is equal to 0,245 P <0.001 which means tohave positive and significant influence
equal to 25%, so hypothesis 5 can be accepted. This illustrates that IJ can increase MP because the
information generated from IJ can have a positive effect on manager behavior so as to improve managerial
performance. This finding is consistent (9)findings regarding information upgrades with interactional
occurrence in order to improve managerial performance. 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From the above discussion,some conclusion scan be drawn, among others: 1. CPMS have a significant
direct relationship to MP, OJ, IJ. 2. OJ and IJ areable to mediate the influence of CPMS and MP.ln other
words, the implementation of distributive and interactional justice will be able to encourage the creations of
improved implementation of CPMS better so that relations and cooperation among subordinates, superiors
with subordinates will further improve. Therefore, it will result to the improvement of managerial performance.
This study has several limitations, among others: firstly, the sample used is a large Indonesian
manufacturing company so it takes a long time to be able to collect the questionnaire. It is because the
managers have a very busy job so there waslittle time to respond to the questionnaire or they did not want to
respond to the questionnaire. Second, managers know best how well they work, but performance
evaluations on the basis of self- assessment conducted in this study may be biased. REFERENCES [1]
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia is the 20th ranked countries and territories of the most corrupt in the public sector, 
according to data reported by Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 2013. Another form of 
fraud cases related to the procurement of goods and services. Lack of responsibility and 
ability of the Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (GISA) or Aparat Pengawas Intern 
Pemerintah (APIP) in detecting fraud is one of root causes of that condition. Indonesian 
Government Internal Auditors Association (IGIAA) or Asosiasi Auditor Internal Pemerintah 
Indonesia (AAIPI) reported that 94 percent of APIP is not able to detect fraud. However, 
Government Regulation No. 79 of 2005 stated that the Government Internal Supervisory 
Apparatus (APIP) has duty to control the government affairs or considered as an internal 
auditor in accordance with its functions and authority (Presiden Republik Indonesia 2005). 
This study intends to develop these issues by examining that matters relating to the 
responsibility of internal auditors to detect fraud in Indonesian government. 
Internal audit standards do not prescribe different detection responsibilities for fraudulent 
financial reporting (FFR), misappropriation of assets (MoA), and corruption (CRR) that have 
a direct and material effect on the financial statements. However, the research literature 
provided evidence and suggested that perceived responsibility of professional for fraud 
detection differ across fraud types (Dezoort and Harrison 2008, ACFE 2008, KPMG 2003 and 
2006).  
In this study, the accountability refers to concept of accountability of the social 
contingency model. The concept suggests that accountability pressures can stimulate 
politically motivated needs to sustain the positives of constituents important evaluations 
(Tetlock 1992). In this case, when a government internal auditor (APIP) has no high 
responsibility for detecting fraud, their accountability will be questionable by the public. 
Several studies have shown the role of accountability to affect the auditor performance 
(Asare et al., 2000; Tan&Kao 1999; Cloyd 1997; Koonce et al., 1995; Tan 1995; Ashton 
1990), affects the effects of dilution and audit evidence (Glover 1997; Hoffman&Patton 1997 
and Tan 1995) and have influenced opinion and judgment audit (Kennedy 1993; Ashton 1992; 
Johson&Kaplan 1991, Buchman et al. 1996 and Lerner&Tetlock 1999). Dezoort and Harrison 
(2008) study showed that accountability (ACC) and anonymous (ANN) influenced perceived 
responsibility in detecting fraud. 
The finding of this study shows that there are no significant differences for internal 
auditors to detect fraud among the three types of fraud. Moreover, there are significant 
differences for internal auditors in detecting fraud between ACC and ANN internal auditor 
accountability. ANN auditors have higher degree of perceived responsibility for detecting 
fraud than ANN auditors 
2. LITERATURE REVIEWS 
2.1. Internal Auditors’ Standards Related to Fraud  
International Standard IIA (The Institute of Internal Auditors') for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing (Standards) provides specific authoritative guidance for internal auditors in 
fraud field. As stated by Standard 1210.A2 that internal auditors should have sufficient 
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knowledge to evaluate fraud risks to manage organization. However, it can not be predicted 
how such skill sets a person with the responsibility to detect and investigate fraud. The 
internal audit standards explain that there are pressures of various parties to improve fraud 
standards for internal auditors. 
Furthermore, the risk management standard (2120.A2) states that the function of internal 
auditor is to evaluate the activity of potential fraud and how the organization manages fraud 
risk. The standard is clearly connected to the internal audit function of fraud risk 
management. However, these standards do not directly talk about the responsibilities of 
internal auditors to detect fraud. Furthermore, literature showed insufficient evidence of the 
perceived responsibilities of internal auditors to detect fraud and how such perceptions affect 
performance of fraud. 
According to the Indonesian Government Internal Audit Standards (Asosiasi Auditor 
Intern Pemerintah Indonesia (AAIPI) 2014), auditor is a position that has scope, duties, 
responsibilities, and authority to conduct internal audit in government agencies, organizations 
and/or other parties in a state in accordance with the law's invitation, which is occupied by 
civil servants with rights and obligations granted by the competent authority. Based on 
description of the implementation of the standards, we can conclude that auditors should have 
sufficient competence to perform the potential fraud detection. However, from the details of 
the Indonesian Government Internal Audit Standards, there is no rule which asserts that the 
auditor is obliged directly to conduct fraud detection in government agencies as an auditee. 
The extant literatures have lacks in research evidence for evaluating the internal auditors' 
perceived responsibility on fraud detection and how this sense of responsibility affects fraud-
related performance. 
By default, there are no binding rules for the internal auditors to have duties and 
responsibility to detect and investigate the occurrence of fraud (Standard 1210.A2, IIA 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing). Standard of 
internal audit suggests that the existence of professional responsibility for internal auditors to 
detect fraud that intends to create a sense of responsibility the auditor. However, not much is 
known about the extent to which internal auditors perceive a responsibility to detect fraud or 
factors underlying the responsibility for what they feel (DeZoort&Harrison, 2008).  
2.2. The Triangle Model of Responsibility 
Schlenker's triangle model (Schlenker 1997) identified several reasons that people use to 
avoid responsibility after failure: that one has no control in situation, liability is not clear, and 
it is not really one's duties. From this perspective, we can assume that there is a negative 
relationship between making excuses and take responsibility. The triangle models of 
responsibility considers how people make excuses, so as to avoid taking responsibility for 
personal failure. In a sense, the model considers the ways people behave in “in bad faith” 
dignity and a sense of personal responsibility by shifting the mistakes of others. The triangle 
is a model of responsibility proposed by Schlenker and colleagues (Schlenker et al. 1994; 
2001), defined as a statement of reasons or attributions that allows one to “minimize liability 
personal to an event” (Schlenker et al., 1994, p. 637), both for theirself and with others.Thus, 
making reason is partly an emotional control tool and as an impression-management tool 
(Doherty and Schlenker, 1995, Schlenker et al., 1994). The triangle model illustrates three 
important aspects of the responsibilities include: prescription (ie, what should be done), the 
identity (ie, sense of self), and the situation or event (that is relevant to the prescription). 
Figure 1 shows a model of responsibility Schlenker known as the Triangle Models of 
Responsibility. 
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Figure 1 The Triangle Model of Responsibility (Schlenker, 1994) 
Schlenker (1994) in Figure 1 on the triangle model of responsibility showed that the 
prescription-event (task clarity) link is considered weaker when the prescription is ambiguous, 
conflicting, difficult to prioritize, or questionable in terms of relevance to the event. 
Otherwise, the link will be stronger to the extent that the prescription are specified in advance, 
pertinent to the situation, not subject to alternative interpretations, and not in conflict with 
other prescriptions that might be applied in the situation. The prescription-identity 
(professional obligation) link is weaker when the prescription is ambiguous, unclear, or 
conflicting. In contrast the link will be stronger to the extent that prescriptions apply 
unambiguously to the individual. The identity-event (personal control) link is weaker when an 
individual’s will act is diminished because action consequences are unforeseeable, accidental, 
or influenced by uncontrollable factors. However, this link will be stronger when an 
individual intends to produce specific consequences and had ability and freedom. 
3. HYPOTHESES  
3.1. The Impact of Fraud Type on Perceived Responsibility 
According to internal audit standards, there is no difference perceived responsibility in 
detection fraud for FFR, MoA, and CRR frauds. Nevertheless, several previous studies have 
shown different results. DeZoort&Harrison (2008) and ACFE (2008) found that external 
auditors perceive more responsibility for detecting FFR than they do for MoA and CRR. 
Other studies have shown different results that internal auditors are more familar and accept 
higher responsibilities in detecting MoA than FFR and CRR (KPMG 2003, 2006). The 
inconsistency of the research results motivates the researcher to examine whether the 
perceived responsibility of the internal government auditor to detect fraud is different among 
the three types of fraud.  
Accordingly, we questioned whether internal auditors’ perceived responsibility for 
detecting fraud would differ across fraud type. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
H1 : Perceived responsibility of internal auditors' in detecting fraud does not differ among 
fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption. 
3.2. The Impact of Accountability on Perceived Responsibility  
Schlenker (1997) defined accountability as accountability to audiences to do something in 
accordance with established standards by fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and other 
costs. Schlenker&Leary (1982) discussed social anxieties created when accountability 
pressures occur. Accountability concepts use Carver's (1979) model of "self-attention" in 
which an increasing concerns the fulfillment of a person's standard accomplishments. 
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Nevertheless, Tetlock (1992) proposed a model of social contingency that suggested 
accountability pressures can stimulate politically motivated needs to sustain the positives of 
constituents critical evaluative. 
The Triangle Model of Responsibility suggests that accountability and responsibility are 
related but in different constructs. Schlenker (1997, 250) stated that responsibility is not 
identical with accountability, in fact, that responsibility is the result of accountability. This 
suggests that accountability is a form of pressure on internal auditors by others (eg senior 
management, audit committees, internal audit standards and others), and the perceived 
responsibility is an internal response of internal auditors to external pressures.  
Several studies have shown the role of accountability to affect the performance of auditors 
on testing strategies (Asare et al., 2000), task complexity (Tan&Kao 1999), justifications of 
audit-planning decisions (Koonce et al. 1995), memory for audit Evidence and judgment (Tan 
1995) and accounting decision settings (Ashton 1990). Accountability affects the effects of 
dilution (Hoffman&Patton 1997). Accountability affects opinion (Johnson&Kaplan 1991) and 
judgment audit (Kennedy 1993). Accountability effects on a social judgments and choices 
(Buchman et al. 1996; Lerner&Tetlock 1999). Study of Dezoort&Harrison (2008) showed 
that accountability and anonymous influence perceived responsibility and brainstorming in 
detecting fraud. Thus, accountable auditors have higher perceived responsibility than auditors 
who do not get accountability. This indicates that the pressure of accountability increases the 
individual responsibility in detecting fraud. 
Based on this framework, this research builds the following two hypotheses: 
H2 : Accountable auditors have degree of perceived responsibility for detecting fraud higher 
than anonymous auditors. 
4. RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1. Subject 
One hundred and two internal auditors in Indonesia participated in the experiment. We 
collected data for this project during visited education and training functional Internal auditor 
Indonesian government. Subjects were assigned randomly to experimental conditions. 
Participation was voluntary. Two consecutive experimental sessions were held. Subjects had 
no opportunity for communications between experimental sessions. An approximately equal 
number of subjects took part in each of the experimental sessions. Total sample that can be 
analyzed in this research is 92 (ninety two) research samples or about 90% (ninety percent). 
There are 10 data can not be processed because respondents do not fill experimental 
instruction completely.  
4.2. Research Design 
The experiment applied a 3x2 between-subject design. The independent variable was level of 
fraud type and cognitive style. We manipulated three level fraud types as FFR, MoA and CRR 
and accountability was manipulated as ACC and ANN. 
4.3. Procedures Experimental Task  
All experimental tasks can be completed in approximately forty minutes. The task that 
participants must perform is the first time participants are asked to fill in their identities as 
internal auditors at the government agencies in which they work. The questions include name, 
age, gender, education, workplace agency, job title, length of service and amount of audit 
experience. In addition, participants were also asked to select the accountability pressure 
provided. Second, participants should do to understand the information about the government 
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agency and the fraud content that occurs therein. There are three types of fraud to be tested 
(FFR, MoA, CRR) in which participants are presented only one type of fraud for detection. 
The participants were then asked to answer questions related to auditor's perceived 
responsibility based on three elements of triangle model of responsibility from Schlenker 
(1994). In the last session a question was asked for manipulation checks to ascertain whether 
participants understood the given experiment assignment scenario.  
4.4. Research Scenario  
All three fraud types describes a current period of fraud in an area where the participants were 
conducting internal audit work. The FFR scheme, the head of health department has included 
third party health fees retribution worth 200 million in the annual financial statements. This 
fraud occurs because he has been unable to collect third party health fees for two years. The 
MoA scheme describes a situation where the head of health office has committed theft of cash 
by making fake purchases of pharmacy. He uses fake documents of certain pharmaceutical 
companies to place orders and bills on purchasing of unreal pharmacy. The CRR scheme 
illustrates that he has a health equipment procurement program by nepotism in selecting a 
supplier company and doing project value engineering. Participants are informed that the head 
of the health office is cheating by acting alone (not colluding) and the cheating is unknown to 
others. 
4.5. Measures 
Perceived responsibility to detect fraud as measured by six questions related to the triangle 
model of responsibility links. Specifically, two questions related to the prescription-identity 
(professional obligation) link, two questions related to the prescription-event (task clarity) 
link, and two questions related to the identity-event (personal control) link. The questions 
were measured using a 100 point scale (Schlenker et al. 1994). Accountability variable is 
conditioned on two levels: accountable and anonymous. Accountable participants are 
participants who respond to reviews by providing their personal identity either through their 
name or email address. While anonymous participants do not provide personal information 
and have no attempt to make contact with reviewers for their responses. The accountability 
pressure shown the response of personal information is considered to be the pressure placed 
by others such as senior management, audit committees, internal audit standards and others.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1. Manipulations Checks 
Table 1 shows that the participants found that the research scenario is realistic (mean = 82.15 
on a 100-point scale anchored “Very unrealistic” and “Very realistic”) and understandable 
(mean = 67.55 on a 100-point scale anchored “Very difficult to understand” and “Very easy to 
understand”). The participants also found that the fraud cases is material (mean = 74.70 on a 
100-point scale anchored “Very immaterial” and “Very material”). Participans have 
likelihood of detection (mean = 73.80 on a 100-point scale anchored “no chance of detection” 
and “absolutely would”). Participans are willing to change of responsibility (mean = 74.90 on 
a 100-point scale anchored “far less responsibility” and “far more responsibility”). 
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Table 1 Manipulation Checks 
 Mean Std. Deviation 
Materiality 74.70 2.030 
Understandable 67.55 2.284 
Realistic 82.15 1.671 
Likelihood of Detection 73.80 1.932 
Change of Responsibility 74.90 1.486 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics perceived responsibility based on fraud type scenarios 
and accountability pressures. 
Tabel 2 Descriptive Statistic 
 FFR MoA Crr ACC ANN 
N 29 29 34 43 49 
Mean 75.24 81,69 78,68 81,84 75,65 
Median 80.00 83.00 83.00 83.00 78.00 
Variance 214.404 160.007 245.862 153.187 247.731 
Std. Deviation 14.643 12.649 15.680 12.377 15.739 
Minimum 45 52 30 45 30 
Maximum 95 100 100 100 100 
Range 50 48 70 55 70 
Interquartile Range 26 18 17 17 28 
Skewness -.524 -.557 -1.265 -.953 -.703 
Kurtosis -.923 -.337 1.773 1.054 -.010 
Note: FFR, fraudulent financial reporting; MoA, misappropriation of assets; Crr, corruption; ACC, 
accountable; ANN, anonymous.  
Table 2 presents mean and standard deviation of participants who were given fraudulent 
financial reporting (mean=75.24; std.dev=14.643), misappropriation of assets (mean=81.69; 
std.dev=12.649) and corruption (mean=78.68; std.dev=15.680) scenarios. Descriptive statistic 
perceived responsibility fraud detection for accountability pressure shows that mean of 
accountable and annonymous participants is 81.84 and 75.65 with std. Dev 12.377 and 
15.739.  
5.3. Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one (H1) states that the responsibility of the internal auditor's perceived 
responsibility in detecting fraud does not differ between fraudulent financial reporting, 
misappropriation of assets and corruption. One way anova is used to test hypothesis 1. Panel 
A of table 3 presents one way anova test result indicates that the value of F on test of between 
subjects is 1.445 with a probability significance of 0.241. A probability value above 0.05 
indicates no significant difference in average between the three test groups. Thus it can be 
concluded that the average perceived responsibility for detecting fraud among groups of three 
types of fraud does not differ significantly. It can be concluded that the internal auditor's 
perceived responsibility in detecting fraud does not differ between fraudulent financial 
reporting, misappropriation of assets and corruption. Adjusted R Squared value of 0.010 
indicates that variability of perceived responsibility for detecting fraud can only be explained 
by variability of fraud type difference of 1%. 
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Table 3 Result of Hypotheses Test 
Panel A. Test Results of One-way anova 
Fraud Type Levene Tests 
Test of Between 
Subjects 
F Sig F Sig 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
0,437 0,674* 1,445 0,241* Missappropriation of Assets 
Corruption 
R Squared = ,031 (Adjusted R Squared = ,010) 
*significant at the .05 level 
Panel B. The results of the Independent Sample T-test 
Accountability 
Levene Test Equal Variance Assumed 
F Sig T Sig 
Accountable 
3,858 0,053 2,074 0,041 
Annonymous 
*significant at the .05 level 
Panel B of table 3 shows that F arithmetic levene test show that probability significance of 
0.053 (F=3.858, p >.05), it can be concluded that both groups have the same variance. T-test 
different test results show that probability significance of 0.041 (t= 2.074, p < .05). That 
indicates significant mean difference between the two test groups. Thus it can be concluded 
that the average perceived of responsibility for detecting fraud between accountable and 
annonymous groups differed significantly. Hypothesis two (H2) states that internal auditors 
that given accountability pressure have degree of perceived responsibility of detecting fraud 
higher than auditors without accountability pressure was supported.  
5.4. Additional Analisys 
To assess the relationship between the three responsibility points based on the theory of 
triangle model of responsibility (Schlencker 1994), it uses six question items. Two questions 
relate to the relationship of prescription-identity (professional obligation), two questions relate 
to the prescription-event relationship (task clarity) and two questions relate to the identity-
event relationship (personal control). The questions are measured using a 100-point scale. 
Table 5 presents the average perceived responsibility for each question based on a fraud type 
scenario. 
Table 5 Mean of Perceived Responsibility Result 
TMoR Link  FFR MoA Crr ACC ANN 
PO #1 
PO #2 
PO Mean 
80,69 
76,90 
78,80 
84,83 
90,34 
87,59 
80,29 
84,12 
82,21 
86,05 
87,44 
86,75 
78,12 
82,80 
80,46 
TC #1 
TC #2 
TC Mean 
75,86 
70,34 
73,10 
79,31 
78,28 
78,79 
78,82 
77,65 
78,24 
81,16 
78,84 
80,00 
75,42 
72,60 
74,01 
PC #1 
PC #2 
TC Mean 
73,79 
72,50 
73,15 
76,90 
80,69 
78,79 
75,00 
76,18 
75,59 
78,37 
80,71 
79,54 
72,50 
72,80 
72,65 
 
Yusnaini Yusnaini, Imam Ghozali, Fuad Fuad and Etna Nur Afri Yuyetta 
 http://www.iaeme.com/IJCIET/index.asp 432 editor@iaeme.com 
Where: 
PO#1 : Professional obligation (prescription-identity) link is measured by asking “How 
relevant is detecting this fraud to your job?” 
PO#2 : Professional obligation (prescription-identity) link is measured by asking “How 
obligated are you to detect this fraud?” 
TC#1 : Task Clarity (prescription-event) link is measured by asking “How clear is your 
authoritative guidance for detecting this fraud?” 
TC#2 : Task Clarity (prescription-event) link is measured by asking “How informed are you 
about procedures you should follow to detect this fraud?” 
PC#1 : Personal control (identity-event) link is measured by asking “How much control do 
you have as an auditor over your ability to detect this fraud?” 
PC#2 : Personal control (identity-event) link is measured by asking “How much contribution 
do you believe you can make to detection this fraud?” 
The question items on "PO#1 and PO#2" are related to the professional obligation 
(prescription-identity) link. The question on "PO#1 is measured by asking "how relevant is 
detecting this fraud to your work?". The question on "PO#2" is measured by asking "how far 
is your obligation to detect the fraud?". In the types of fraud fraudulent financial reporting, 
missappropriation of assets and corruption, the average answer to question PO#1 is 80.69, 
84.83 and 80.29 respectively. While, mean answer to question of PO#2 is 76.90, 90.34 and 
84.12 respectively. This result shows that perceived responsibility of detecting fraud based on 
the element of professional obligation indicates that the reason of relevance is higher than the 
reason of detecting obligation to the internal auditor of Indonesian government for fraudulent 
financial reporting. The reason of relevance is lower than the reason of detecting obligation to 
the internal auditor of Indonesian government for missapropriation of assets and corruption. 
The question items on "TC#1 and TC#2" are associated with the task clarity (prescription-
event) link. The question on "TC#1" is measured by asking "how clear is your authorization 
guide to detecting the fraud?". The question on "TC # 2" is measured by asking "How did you 
get information about the procedure to be followed to detect the fraud?". In the types of fraud 
fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption the average answer 
to TC#1 question is 75.86, 79.31 and 78.82. While, mean answer to the question of TC#2 is 
70.34, 78.28 and 77.65. Thus this result shows that the perceived responsibility for detecting 
fraud based on the task clarity element indicates that the reason for "authorization" is higher 
than the reason for "information" in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of the Indonesian 
government for fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption. 
The question items on "PC#1 and PC#2" are related to the personal control (identity-
event) link. The question on "PC#1" is measured by asking "how much control do you have as 
an internal auditor for your ability to detect the fraud?". The question on "PC#2" is measured 
by asking "how many contributions can you provide in detecting the fraud?". In the types of 
fraud fraudulent financial reporting, missappropriation of assets and corruption the average 
answer to PC#1 questions is 73.79, 76.90 and 75.00 respectively. While, mean answer to the 
question of PC#2 is 72.50, 80.69 and 76.18. Thus this result shows that the perceived 
responsibility for detecting fraud based on personal control elements indicatesthat the reason 
for "control" is higher than the reason for "contribution" in detecting fraud to the internal 
auditor of Indonesian government for fraudulent financial reporting. The reason for control is 
lower than the reason of contribution in detecting fraud to the internal auditor of Indonesian 
government for missapropriation of assets and corruption. 
At accountable and annonymous accountability pressures, the average answer to the PO#1 
question is 86.05 and 78.12,while, 87.44 and 82.80 for PO#2. Thus, this result shows that the 
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perceived responsibility of detecting fraud based on the element of professional obligation 
indicates that the element of relevance is lower than the obligation to detect fraud. Mean 
answer to TC#1 question is 81.16 and 75.42, the average answer to TC#2 question is 78.84 
and 72.60. Thus this result shows that the perceived responsibility for detecting fraud based 
on task clarity element indicates that the reason for "authorization" is higher than 
"information" in detecting fraud. The average answer to PC#1 questions is 78.73 and 72.50, 
whereas the average answer to PC#2 questions is 80.71 and 72.80. Thus, this result shows that 
the perceived responsibility of detecting fraud based on personal control elements indicates 
that the reason for "control" is lower than the reason of "contribution" in detecting fraud to the 
internal auditor of Indonesian government. 
6. DISCUSSION 
There are several findings in this study. First, the average perceived responsibility of internal 
auditor in detecting fraud does not differ significantly between FFR, MoA and CRR. This 
result differs from the results of research by Dezoort&Harrison (2008) and ACFE (2008) that 
indicated external auditors received higher responsibilities in detecting FFR than MoA and 
CRR. The results of this study also differ from other research results which show that internal 
auditors are more familar in detecting MoA than FFR and CRR (ACFE 2008, KPMG 2003, 
2006, DeZoort&Harrison 2008). 
Based on the Triangle Model of Responsibility theory, fraud scenarios whether FFR, MoA 
and CRR, professional bond obligation elements are higher in explaining perceived 
responsibility than task clarity and personal control. In the fraud type scenario for both the 
FFR, MoA and CRR, the reasons for the relevance of the fraud case faced in the assignment 
do not differ significantly with the responsibility for detecting fraud. This suggests that the 
absence of a difference in perceived responsibility of detecting fraud among the three types of 
fraud is consistent with no difference in the reasons the auditor perceives that responsibility in 
his or her job. 
In Triangle Model of Responsibility theory, the professional element of obligation is a 
combination of prescription and identity. The relationship refers to the extent to which certain 
prescriptions (Auditing Standards of Internal Auditors of the Government of Indonesia) are 
deemed applicable to the actor (auditor). Thus it can be concluded that the internal auditors of 
the Indonesian government feel clearly and firmly that to detect fraud is their responsibility. 
Although within the Indonesian Government's Internal Audit Standards (SAAIPI) there are no 
detailed articles on the responsibilities of government internal auditors in detecting fraud. 
Third, the results of this study also finds that there is a difference in the average perceived 
responsibility for detecting fraud between groups of auditors who are under significant 
accountable and anonymous accountability. Perceived responsibility of the internal 
government auditor to detect fraud in the accountable group is higher than the anonymous 
group. 
Based on the Triangle Model of Responsibility theory, for auditors who have accountable 
or annonal accountability pressures, the professional bonds element is higher in explaining 
perceived responsibility than task clarity and personal control. Moreover, for auditors with 
accountable or annonymous pressures, the reasons related to job relevance detect fraud in jobs 
are lower than for reasons related to direct responsibility in detecting fraud. Thus, the reasons 
related to the level of responsibility of the task in detecting fraud become more dominant than 
the relevance of the case at hand. Although these two reasons are not significantly different 
for the auditor in perceiving their responsibility in detecting fraud. 
The results of this study are consistent with studies conducted by DeZoort&Harrison 
(2008) which showed that accountability affects perceived responsibility in detecting fraud. 
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The results of this study also support studies that examine the role of accountability for 
auditor performance. As Asare et al. (2000), Tan&Kao (1999), Cloyd (1997), Koonce et al. 
(1995), Tan (1995) and Ashon (1990) showed that accountability had an effect on the 
performance of the auditor . 
The results of this study are expected to provide an empirical contribution to the theory of 
responsibility The Triangle Model of Responsibility (Schlenker 1997) which is a 
psychological theory that can confirm the perceived responsibility of the auditor's in detecting 
fraud. The Triangle Model of Responsibility places that perceived responsibilities of the 
internal government auditor as a direct function of the power of the three psychological 
relationships among the three formative elements of responsibility. Findings from the results 
of hypothesis testing one (H1) and hypothesis two (H2) prove that the determinant factor of a 
person to be responsible can be explained by professional elements of obligation, task clarity 
and personal control. 
Government agencies/regulators should be able to provide clearly guidance and reference 
on the risks and ways of detecting various types of fraud cases faced by government agencies. 
Thus, although the auditor faces different types of fraud, it is expected that they still have high 
responsibility and optimal effort in detecting any types of fraud cases they have to deal with. 
In addition, related to the role of accountability pressure, by review an auditor, internal 
auditor is expected to have more responsibility and high effort in detecting fraud. Such 
reviews may be from institutions such as BPKP (Finance and Development Supervisory 
Agency) or BPK (Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia), AAIPI (Association of 
Indonesian Government Internal Auditors) or other authorized parties. 
7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
The results of this study have limitations on level of internal government auditors who tend to 
only be at level one. Thus the researcher can not draw conclusions thoroughly at all levels of 
government internal auditors in Indonesia. It is expected that in the future, researchers can 
then use data at all levels of auditor so that the overall conclusion can be obtained. 
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